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Abstract: A Kripke structure for the S5 logic is defined by three sets S,
J and X , a collection (Pj | j ∈ J) of partitions of S and a function ψ :
S → {0, 1}X . To each partition Pj corresponds a person j ∈ J who cannot
distinguish between any two points belonging to the same member of Pj but
can distinguish between different members of Pj . A cell is a minimal subset
C of S such that for all j the property P ∈ Pj and P ∩ C 6= ∅ implies that
P ⊆ C. Construct a sequence R0,R1, . . . of partitions of S inductively by
R0 = {ψ
−1(a) | a ∈ {0, 1}X} and x and y belong to the same member ofRi if
and only if x and y belong to the same member of Ri−1 and for every person
j the members Px and Py of P
j containing x and y respectively intersect
the same members of Ri−1. Let R∞ be the limit of the Ri, namely x and
y belong to the same member of R∞ if and only if x and y belong to the
same member of Ri for every i. For any sets X and J of persons there is a
canonical Kripke structure defined on a set Ω = Ω(X, J) such that from any
Kripke structure for the S5 logic using the same X and J there is a canonical
map to Ω with the property that x and y are mapped to the same point of
Ω if and only if x and y share the same member of R∞. We define a cell of
Ω to be surjective if every Kripke structure for the S5 logic that maps to it
does so surjectively. A cell of a Kripke structure for the S5 logic has finite
fanout if every P ∈ Pj contained in the cell is a finite set. All cells of Ω with
finite fanout are surjective, but the converse does not hold.
Key words: Kripke Structures, Common Knowledge, Baire Category, Can-
tor Sets, Games of Incomplete Information, Bayesian Games
1 Introduction
Common knowledge by all persons in J of the event E means that for every
string of persons i1, i2, . . . , ik in J it holds that ik knows that ik−1 knows that
... i1 knows that the event E has occurred (Lewis 1969). One way to formalise
knowledge and common knowledge is through semantic models called Kripke
structures, (see also Aumann, 1976.) In this paper, we assume throughout
the S5 logic (defined below), so that we will refer to these structures simply
as Kripke structures. Applying the above definition of common knowledge
to this context (as defined in the abstract), a subset A is known in common
by all the persons in J at the point x ∈ A if the cell containing x is contained
in the set A.
First, lets look at an example that illustrates part of the problem solved in
this paper. Let N be {1, 2, . . .} ∪ {∞}, and give N the topology where all
integers are isolated points however the sequence 1, 2, ... converges to∞. Let
S be N×N with the corresponding product topology. Let J be {1, 2, 3}. For
every i define the set P 1i = {(i, 1), (i, 2), . . . , (i,∞)}, including the possibility
of i =∞. For every i defined the set P 2i = {(1, i), (2, i), . . . , (∞, i)}, including
the possibility of i = ∞. For every i define the set P 3i = {(k, l) | k + l = i}
with P 3∞ = {(k, l) | either k or l is equal to∞}. For each j = 1, 2, 3 define the
partition Pj of S to be {P j1 , P
j
2 , . . . , P
j
∞}. Let X be a singleton {x}. Let the
evaluation function ψ give the evaluation 1 to the point (1, 1), the evaluation
1 to the point (2, 1), and everywhere else the evaluation 0. It is not difficult to
see that the Ri as defined in the abstract eventually separates all the points
of S (once the three points (0, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1) are distinquished from
each other). According to results presented later in this paper, this Kripke
structure is homeomorphic to a cell of Ω(X, J) that does not have finite
fanout. As we will see later, this cell is also not surjective. Experimentation
with such examples gives the false impression that surjectivity and finite
fanout are equivalent properties. We will discover later why it is difficult to
construct such a cell that is both surjective and fails to have finite fanout.
We return to this example later.
The above example shares much in common with well known examples of
game theory. In particular, the two-person non-zero-sum Electronic Mail
Game of Rubinstein (1989) is based on a structure of information with sim-
ilar properties to the above example. In the Rubinstein game, there is a
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special point at infinity where the players would have common knowledge of
a certain payoff matrix (the payoff matrix could be determined by an evalua-
tion function φ) and it is the limit point of an infinite sequence of points that
are included in the game. However this special point at infinity is excluded
from the game and at the initial point of the sequence and only at this initial
point a different payoff matrix is valid. The “almost common knowledge” in
the title of the article refers to the almost common knowledge of the payoff
matrix valid at both the special point at infinity and all but one of the other
points. The analysis of the Rubinstein game shows that the equilibrium be-
havior at these limiting points is very different from that at the excluded
limit point at infinity. The structure of the Rubinstein example has finite
fanout, but by adding an extra third player to this structure Fagin, Halpern
and Vardi (1991) constructed an interesting example of a cell of the appro-
priate Ω that is not surjective and does not have finite fanout. Mapping to
this cell injectively are two alternative Kripke structures, one where the third
person cannot distinguish between the special point and all the other points
and another where the third person does exclude this special point. As we
will see later, the point (∞,∞) of our example is a similar special point at
infinity.
The Electronic Mail Game shows that equilibrium behavior can fail to be
continuous with respect to changes in the information structure. A more
radical but related discovery is a three-person non-zero-sum Bayesian game
such that all equilibrium behavior is not measurable with respect to the
structure of information (Simon 2003). Although the underlying information
structure of this Bayesian game is related closely to the main result of this
paper, it does have finite fanout and therefore does not provide an example
of a surjective cell lacking finite fanout.
Before we can describe our main result, we must define Ω(X, J), the canonical
Kripke structure .
Let X be a set of primitive propositions, and let J be a set of agents. Al-
though it is legitimate to consider the case of either X or J infinite, for this
paper we will assume throughout that both X and J are finite. Construct
the set L(X, J) of formulas using the sets X and J in the following way:
1) If x ∈ X then x ∈ L(X, J),
2) If g ∈ L(X, J) then (¬g) ∈ L(X, J),
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3) If g, h ∈ L(X, J) then (g ∧ h) ∈ L(X, J),
4) If g ∈ L(X, J) then kjg ∈ L(X, J) for every j ∈ J ,
5) Only formulas constructed through application of the above four rules are
members of L(X, J).
We write simply L if there is no ambiguity. ¬f stands for the negation of f ,
f ∧ g stands for both f and g. f ∨ g stands for either f or g (inclusive) and
f → g stands for ¬f ∧ g.
IfK = (S,P, J,X, ψ) is a Kripke structure then define a map αK from L(X, J)
to 2S, the subsets of S, inductively on the structure of the formulas:
Case 1 f = x ∈ X: αK(x) := {s ∈ S | ψx(s) = 1}.
Case 2 f = ¬g: αK(f) := S\αK(g),
Case 3 f = g ∧ h: αK(f) := αK(g) ∩ αK(h),
Case 4 f = kj(g): α
K(f) := {s | s ∈ P ∈ Pj ⇒ P ⊆ αK(g)}.
There is a very elementary logic defined on the formulas in L called S5. For a
longer discussion of the S5 logic, see Cresswell and Hughes (1968); and for the
multi-person variation, see Halpern and Moses (1992) and also Bacharach,
et al, (1997). Briefly, the S5 logic is defined by two rules of inference, modus
ponens and necessitation, and five types of axioms. Modus ponens means
that if f is a theorem and f → g is a theorem, then g is also a theorem.
Necessitation means that if f is a theorem then kjf is also a theorem for all
j ∈ J . The axioms are the following, for every f, g ∈ L(X, J) and j ∈ J :
1) all formulas resulting from theorems of the propositional calculus through
substitution,
2) (kjf ∧ kj(f → g))→ kjg,
3) kjf → f ,
4) kjf → kj(kjf),
5) ¬kjf → kj(¬kjf).
A set of formulas A ⊆ L(X, J) is called complete if for every formula f ∈
L(X, J) either f ∈ A or ¬f ∈ A. A set of formulas is called consistent if no
finite subset of this set leads to a logical contradiction, meaning a deduction
of f and ¬f for some formula f . We define
Ω(X, J) := {S ⊆ L(X, J) | S is complete and consistent}.
Ω(X, J) is itself a Kripke structure with evaluation. For every person j ∈ J
we define its corresponding partition Qj(X, J) to be that generated by the
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inverse images of the function βj : Ω(X, J)→ 2L(X,J) namely
βj(z) := {f ∈ L(X, J) | kjf ∈ z},
the set of formulas known by person j. Due to the fifth set of axioms βj(z) ⊆
βj(z′) implies that βj(z) = βj(z′). We will write Ω, L and Qj if there is no
ambiguity.
If K = (S,P, J,X, ψ) is the corresponding Kripke structure we define a map
φK : S → Ω(X, J) by
φK(s) := {f ∈ L(X, J) | s ∈ αK(f)}.
This is the canonical map referred to in the abstract, also contained in Fagin,
Halpern, and Vardi (1991).
As stated in the abstract, a cell C of a Kripke structure has finite fanout
if every choice of i ∈ J and P ∈ P i contained in C the set P has finitely
many elements. In Simon (1999) a cell of Ω was defined to be surjective if all
Kripke structures K that map to it by φK do so surjectively. We construct
an example of a countable and surjective cell of Ω that does not have finite
fanout. (In Simon (1999) it was proven that any cell of Ω with finite fanout
is surjective and any surjective cell of Ω must be countable.)
Central to understanding the relation between surjectivity and finite fanout is
point-set topology. For every Kripke structure K = (S,P, J,X, ψ) we define
a topology on the set S, the same as in Samet (1990). Let {αK(f) | f ∈ L} be
the base of open sets of S. We call this the topology induced by the formulas.
The topology of a subset A of S will be the relative topology for which the
open sets of A are {A ∩O | O is an open set of S}.
Why is our main result surprising? It is closely related to representations of
Kripke structures through canonical structures indexed by ordinal numbers.
Fagin (1994) defined for any ordinal number γ (and a sets of persons and
primitive propositions) a hierarchically constructed canonical Kripke struc-
ture Wγ such that Wω is Ω, (where ω stands for the first infinite ordinal).
This canonical structure represented all the possible truth evaluations with
the ordinal numbers representing the levels in the construction of these state-
ments. There are alternative canonical constructions corresponding to the
ordinal numbers (Heifetz and Samet 1998, 1999), but with regard to the
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first infinite ordinal ω they are the same as Fagin’s. For every Kripke struc-
ture and ordinal number γ there are canonical maps defined to the canonical
structures Wγ .
If there is an ordinal α such that the map to Wα is injective, then the Kripke
structure is called non-flabby, and the first such ordinal is called the distin-
guishing ordinal. Otherwise the distinguishing ordinal is the first ordinal α
where all pairs of points which get mapped eventually to different places do
so when mapped to Wα. There is another minimal ordinal β, possibly larger
than the distinguishing ordinal, for which the image of the Kripke structure
in Wβ can be extended to any Wγ with γ > β in only one unique way. This
ordinal is called the uniqueness ordinal. Fagin (1994) proved that the unique-
ness ordinal is a limit ordinal and never greater than the next limit ordinal
above the distinguishing ordinal. Fagin established that the necessary and
sufficient condition for a cell of Ω to have the first infinite ordinal ω as its
uniqueness ordinal is that the cell has finite fanout. Without explicitly men-
tioning topology, Fagin (1994) showed that any member P of some Qj is a
compact subset of Ω. An extension to Wω+1 of an z in Ω is defined by dense
subsets Rj of the various Pj ∈ Q
j containing z. Therefore there is a unique
extension of a cell of Ω if and only if for every person j every Pj ∈ P
j in the
cell has only one dense subset, which is equivalent to the cell having finite
fanout.
If a cell of Ω does not have finite fanout, we know that there is no unique
extension of this cell to the higher levels. It is plausible to believe that this
lack of a unique extension can be realised by alternative Kripke structures
that map injectively to Ω. For the structure that maps injectively but not
surjectively to this cell, the persons would have common knowledge that some
set of formulas valid somewhere in the cell are not valid at any point in the
original Kripke structure. The surjective property is exactly the impossibility
of such a common knowledge of formula exclusion.
There is a good reason why one can believe easily that the surjectivity and
finite fanout properties of cells are equivalent. The relationship between the
properties rests largely upon a property called centeredness. The centered
property has several equivalent definitions; the most straightforward defini-
tion is that a cell of Ω is centered if and only if no other cell of Ω shares the
same set of formulas held in common knowledge (Simon 1999). (The set of
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formulas held in common knowledge is a constant throughout any given cell;
see Halpern and Moses 1992). An equivalent formulation of centeredness is
that the cell is an open set relative to the closure of itself. The difference
between centered and uncentered cells is radical; if a cell is not centered then
there are uncountably many other cells sharing the same set of formulas in
common knowledge (Simon 1999). Furthermore the converse does hold for
centered cells of Ω, namely that a centered cell of Ω is surjective if and only
if it has finite fanout (Theorem 3b, Simon 1999).
The lack of finite fanout for a cell C of Ω implies the existence a cluster point
y of some P ∈ Qj that is contained in C. Is the point y is a good candidate
for the existence of a Kripke structure that maps to C\{y}? If C is centered
there will be such a Kripke structure that maps to C but avoids the point y.
Returning to the above example, we see that the corresponding cell of
Ω({x, }, {1, 2, 3}) is centered, a context in which surjectivity and finite fanout
are equivalent. According to Simon (1999) there is a Kripke structure that
maps injectively but not surjectively to this cell which results from removing
the single point (∞,∞). According to the same theory, the same can be
done by removing all the cluster points, namely the set P3∞, and furthermore
these are the only two ways to map injectively but not surjectively to this
cell.
In the next section, we provide some more background necessary to under-
stand our solution. In the third and concluding section, we present our
example of a cell of Ω that is surjective but without finite fanout.
2 More Background
Central to this paper is the first part of Lemma 5 of Simon (1999), which
states that if K = (S; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);X ;ψ) is a Kripke structure and P is
a member of Pj for some j ∈ J then φK(P ) is a dense subset of F for some
F ∈ Qj . This fact was used implicitly by Fagin (1994).
Given a Kripke structure K = (S; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);X ;ψ) and a subset A ⊆ S,
we define the Kripke structure VK(A) := (A; J ; (Pj|A | j ∈ J);X ;ψ|A) where
for all j ∈ J Pj |A := {F ∩ A | F ∩ A 6= ∅ and F ∈ P
j}. We define a subset
A ⊆ Ω to be good if for every j ∈ J and every F ∈ Qj satisfying F ∩ A 6= ∅
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it follows that F ∩A is dense in F . By Lemma 6 of Simon (1999) A is good
if and only if for every z ∈ A φV
K(A)(z) = z.
The next lemmatta relate directly the good property to our problem.
Lemma 7 of Simon (1999): If K = (S; J ; (Pj|j ∈ J);X ;ψ) is a Kripke
structure then φK(S) is a good subset.
Lemma 9 of Simon (1999): If A is a good subset of a cell C and if A∩F is
closed for every F ∈ Pj with A ∩ F 6= ∅, then A = C.
We need a few more facts about Ω(X, J) for non-empty X and J . If |J | ≥ 2
then Ω(X, J) is topologically equivalent to a Cantor set, (Fagin, Halpern
and Vardi 1991). A Cantor set with the usual topology is a metric space.
Second we can perceive a Cantor set as {0, 1}N, where each finite sequence
a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) defines a cylinder subset C(a) of {0, 1}N by C(a) := {z ∈
{0, 1}N | zk = ak ∀k ≤ n}. Furthermore all cylinder subsets are themselves
topologically equivalent to Cantor sets, and the same holds for finite unions
of cylinder sets. Third, if |J | ≥ 2 then there exists an uncentered cell of
Ω(X, J) of finite fanout that is dense in Ω(X, J) (Simon 1999).
Due to topological formulations of the centered property, to demonstrate
that there is a surjective cell without finite fanout requires some topological
insight. Central to our proof is Theorem 9 of Chapter 12 of E. Moise, (1977):
Let X and Y be two totally disconnected, perfect, compact metric spaces
(equivalently Cantor sets) and let X ′ and Y ′ be countable and dense subsets
of X and Y , respectively. There is a homeomorphism between X and Y that
is also a bijection between X ′ and Y ′.
We call a partition P of a metric space D upper (respectively lower) hemi-
continuous if the set valued correspondence that maps every d ∈ D to the
partition member of P containing d is an upper (respectively lower) hemi-
continuous correspondence. (We follow the definitions of Klein and Thomp-
son, 1984.)
Lemma 1: If K := (S; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);X ;ψ) is a Kripke structure with a
topology (not necessarily that induced by the formulas) such that
1) for every z ∈ {0, 1}X the set ψ−1(z) is clopen (closed and open) and
2) for every j ∈ N the partition Pj is lower and upper hemi-continuous,
then the map φK : S → Ω(X, J) is continuous.
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Proof: It suffices to show that αK(f) is a clopen set for every f ∈ L(X, J).
We proceed by induction on the structure of formulas. The claim is true
for all f = x ∈ X by hypothesis. Due to the clopen property being closed
under complementation and finite intersection, it is likewise true for ¬f and
f ∧ g if it is true for f and g. For some f ∈ L(X, J) we assume that αK(f)
is a clopen set. αK(kjf) is an open set by the upper semi-continuity of P
j
and the openness of αK(f). S\αK(kjf) = α
K(¬kjf) is an open set by the
openness of S\αK(f) and the lower semi-continuity of Pj . ✷
Lemma 2: Given X and J finite, for every j ∈ J the partition Qj(X, J)
of Ω(X, J) is upper and lower hemi-continuous with respect to the topology
induced by the formulas.
Proof: Let z1, z2, . . . be a sequence of points in Ω(X, J) converging to some
z ∈ P ∈ Qj with zi ∈ Pi ∈ Q
j for every i = 1, 2, . . ..
To prove thatQj is upper hemi-continuous it suffices to show that if y1, y2, . . .
is a sequence of points in Ω(X, J) converging to y with y1 ∈ P1, y2 ∈ P2, . . .
then y is in P . Let f be any formula such that kjf ∈ y. Since the yi converge
to y there is an N such that for every i ≥ N it must hold that kjf is in both
yi and zi. But this means that kjf is also in z. The same argument holds
for the formula ¬kjf .
To prove that Qj is lower hemi-continuous it suffices to show that if y ∈ P
then there is a sequence of y1, y2, . . . in P1, P2, . . . respectively that converges
to y. Because there are only countably many formulas and one can create a
new sequence from the diagonal of sequences which come closer and closer to
y, if the claim were not true then there would be some formula f in y and an
N such that f is not in any member of Pi for all i ≥ N . This would imply
also that kj(¬f) is in zi for all i ≥ N and likewise that kj(¬f) is in z. But
this would contradict that the assumption that f is in y and y is in P . ✷.
3 The Example
Let S equal Ω(X, {1, 2}) withX any finite non-empty set. Let C be an uncen-
tered cell of finite fanout that is dense in S. We assume that pi : S → {0, 1}N
is a homeomorphism. For every n ∈ N define pin : S → {0, 1}
n by pin(z)
equalling the a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n such that pi(z) = (a1, . . . , an, . . .).
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This means that pi−1n ◦pin(z) equals C(pin(z)), the corresponding cylinder set.
If a is the empty sequence in {0, 1}0 then define pi0(z) := a and pi
−1
0 ◦pi0(z) = S
for all z ∈ S.
Let z be any member of C and for every i = 1, 2, . . . let zi be a mem-
ber of C such that pi2i−2(zi) = pi2i−2(z) but pi2i(zi) 6= pi2i(z). For every
i = 1, 2, . . . define non-empty and mutually disjoint sets Ai,1, Ai,2, . . . Ai,i
in the following way. Let A1,1 equal S\ (pi
−1
2 ◦ pi2(z1) ∪ pi
−1
2 ◦ pi2(z)). For
1 ≤ k < i let Ai,k := pi
−1
2i−2 ◦ pi2i−2(zk)\ pi
−1
2i ◦ pi2i(zk) and let Ai,i :=
pi−12i−2 ◦ pi2i−2(z)\ (pi
−1
2i ◦ pi2i(zi) ∪ pi
−1
2i ◦ pi2i(z)). Because for every a ∈ {0, 1}
2i
there are four members b of {0, 1}2i+2 such that a = pi2i ◦ pi
−1
2i+2(b), all the
sets Ai,j are non-empty and homeomorphic to Cantor sets. By Proposition
1, for every i ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ i there is a homeomorphism fk : Ai,1 → Ai,k
such that fk maps C ∩ Ai,1 bijectively to C ∩ Ai,k. This implies for every
i ≥ 1 that there exists an upper and lower semi-continuous partition P i of
C ∩ (∪ik=1Ai,k) such that every partition member of P
i has i members, one
member in Ai,k for every 1 ≤ k ≤ i. Notice that all the Ai,k are mutually
disjoint, meaning that Ai,k = Ai∗,j∗ if and only if i = i
∗ and k = k∗. Further-
more the disjoint union ∪i≥1 ∪1≤k≤i Ai,k is equal to S\ {z, z1, z2, . . .}. Let P
be (∪∞i=1P
i) ∪ {z, z1, z2, . . .}, a partition of C. It is straightforward to check
that P is upper and lower semi-continuous. We define A be the Kripke struc-
ture (C; {1, 2, 3};Q1|C ,Q
2|C ,P;X,ψ|C), with the partition P corresponding
to the third person.
Theorem: φA maps C bijectively to a cell of Ω({1, 2, 3}) that is surjective
but without finite fanout.
Proof: We have by Lemma 1 that φA : C → Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}) is continu-
ous. Since every member of Q1|C , Q
2|C , or P is compact, their images in
Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}) are also compact. By Lemma 9 of Simon (1999) φA maps
C surjectively to a cell φA(C) of Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}). Between any two points
of φA(C) there is an adjacency path using images of members of Q1|C and
Q2|C , therefore there can be no proper good subset of φ
A(C). By Lemma
7 of Simon (1999) this implies that φA(C) is a surjective cell. Since for ev-
ery f ∈ L(X, {1, 2}) αΩ(X,{1,2})(f) gets mapped to αΩ(X,{1,2,3})(f), φA is an
injective and an open map (meaning that open sets are mapped to open
sets), and therefore the map φA is also a homeomorphism of C to φA(C).
Therefore the image of the one infinite set in P is also an infinite set in the
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cell φA(C), which implies that this cell of Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}) does not have finite
fanout. q.e.d.
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